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Abstract This paper will address René Girard’s critique of the “humanization 
of nothingness” in modern Western philosophy. I will first explain how the “de-
sire for death” is related to a phenomenon that Girard refers to as “obstacle ad-
diction.” Second, I will point out how mankind’s desire for death and illusory 
will to self-divinization gradually tend to converge within the history of modern 
Western humanism. In particular, I will show how this convergence between self-
destruction and self-divinization gradually takes shape through the evolution of 
the concept of “the negative” from Hegel to Kojève, Sartre and Camus. Finally, 
we shall come to see that in Girard’s view “the negative” has tended to become 
an ever-preoccupying and unacknowledged symptom of mankind’s addiction to 
“model/obstacles” of desire. 
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Introduction 
Ever since the revival of Hegelianism in France in the 1930s, the concept 
of the negative has been much debated. Some, such as Alexandre Kojève 
(1902–1968), made the negative one of the key operative concepts of their 
philosophy. Others, like Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), aimed to introduce 
a philosophical critique of the negative. Still others, like Georges Bataille 
(1897–1962), argued that the negative goes beyond the limits of rationality 
and human language. Without going into the specifics of those debates, it 
is conspicuous that they pertain to the question of desire. In many respects, 
Kojève still belongs to the tradition of post-Kantian idealism. In statements 
such as “X is not there,” negation is regarded as the result of an operation of 
the human mind. While things are always perfectly identical to themselves, 
negation “stems for the freedom of the mind, a freedom which must be 
defined by the power to oppose a no to whatever is simply given.” 1 Kojève 
clearly states that the negative should be understood this way, 2 and that 
this freedom to negate the given is what sets apart human beings from the 
rest of the animal kingdom. To him, the negative defines what makes hu-
man desire distinct and free. In contrast to Kojève, Deleuze champions the 
thesis of desire taken as essentially affirmative, creative and productive. 
On the one hand, he expands on Bergson’s idea that the negative is mainly 
an effect of language (i.e. desires and operations of the mind are inherently 
positive and only sometimes appear as negative through the words and 
statements we use). On the other hand, in his very own reading of Nietzsche, 
Deleuze regards the negative as a hallmark of the philosophies of resent-
ment (primarily Platonism, Christianity, Hegelianism), which posit desire 
as stemming from a lack and thereby dismiss the possibility of affirmative 
desire. 3 Like Deleuze, Bataille wants to get beyond Hegelian dialectics. 
However, he does so by redefining the negative as the most excessive and 
destructive component of human desire. In other words, the negative re-
fers to actions and expenditures that are radically opposed to any kind of 
calculation or predetermined plan. It further and more specifically refers 
to what draws desire in the direction of murder, carnage, death and ruin. 
Hegel had failed to acknowledge the deeply irrational dimension of the 
1. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott Fox and J.M. Harding 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 24.
2. “Thus, all action is ‘negating.’ Far from leaving the given as it is, action destroys it; if not 
in its being, at least in its given form.” Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 4.
3. See especially Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983), 8–10.
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negative. Instead, Bataille contends, the German philosopher included the 
negative in a rational discourse aimed at the reconciliation of opposites. 4
In his very first book, René Girard wrote that “The Negative which so 
many modem philosophers identify with freedom and life is in reality the 
herald of slavery and death.” 5 In this paper, I aim to address his critique of 
the negative, which I take to be most enlightening and highly novel. Admit-
tedly, triangular desire may be defined as negative inasmuch as it rests on a 
“lack of being.” However, it also entails the effective (yet often unacknowl-
edged) imitation of a model of desire. Contrary to Kojève, Girard does not 
merely define desire as the negation of the given. Moreover, freedom, far 
from being negative, implies a choice in favor of turning towards positive 
models of desire (especially Jesus Christ, the perfect model of desire). Al-
though Girard contends that an unacknowledged resentment draws philoso-
phers to the concept of the negative, unlike Deleuze he does not vindicate the 
thesis of autonomous, spontaneous and affirmative desire.  6 On the contrary, 
we shall see that an important part of Girard’s critique consists in showing 
that “The affirmation of the self ends in the negation of self. The will to 
make oneself God is a will to self-destruction which is gradually realized.” 
Bataille rightly argues that the negative is related to mankind’s desires for 
destruction and death, and that those desires go beyond Hegelian dialectics. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Bataille, Girard thinks that such desires have 
underlying logics and dynamics that can be uncovered. For the negative, 
as we shall see, is primarily the name of a symptom suggesting humanity’s 
ever more increasing obsession with models/obstacles of desire. 
In addition, what is novel about Girard’s approach is his attempt to trace 
back the origins of philosophers’ fascination with the negative. This fasci-
nation culminated with the “humanization of nothingness,” which Vincent 
Descombes defined as the philosophical enterprise that consists in divin-
izing or dignifying mankind through what seems the most diametrically 
opposite to it, namely the negative or nothingness. 7 From this perspective, 
4. See Georges Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” Yale French Studies 78 (1990): 9–28, 
doi:10.2307/2930112. See also Jacques Derrida’s essay on Bataille “From restricted to general 
economy: A Hegelianism without reserve,” in Writing and Difference (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2001), 317–50.
5. René Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, trans. 
Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), 288. 
6. For Girard’s critique of Deleuze, see “Delirium as System,” in To Double Business Bound 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 84–120. 
7. See Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 9–54. “The humanization of nothingness” 
is the title of the first chapter, which is focused on the works of Alexandre Kojève and Jean-
Paul Sartre.
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humanity is not related to the divine because (however we interpret the 
meaning of this verse) “God created man in His own image; in the image 
of God He created him” (Genesis 1:27 NKJV). On the contrary, humans are 
considered to be divine because they are mortal beings. They are held to 
be divine due to, so to speak, the qualities of “nothingness” or “negativity” 
they possess. The “humanization of nothingness” denotes a specific kind of 
humanism that started with Kojève’s attempt to turn Hegel’s Phenomenol-
ogy into a promethean philosophy, then continued further with Sartre’s 
Existentialism is a Humanism and Camus’s atheistic humanism. Girard 
obviously sees this kind of humanism as indefensible. Mankind’s attempt 
at self-divinization is bound to lead to self-destruction. More than any other 
kind of humanism, the “humanization of nothingness” shows that huma-
nity’s self-divinization is a dead-end. But Girard does not merely want to 
assess the drama of atheistic humanism: he also aims to demonstrate what 
gave rise to it. He clearly shows how mimetic desire can compel human 
beings to endow death or self-destruction with the highest metaphysical 
prestige or, otherwise put, how desire is likely to generate the illusion that 
death is an attribute of self-sufficiency. This illusion, he contends, gradually 
permeated the history of Western philosophy and led to a philosophical 
praising of the negative. Hence, it is not the power of rational reasoning 
that turns death and nothingness into the source of absolute freedom or 
the divine. Rather, human reason comes to serve a desire for death. 
The present paper will first address Girard’s very own conception of 
the desire for death and how it relates to his interpretation of the history 
of Western philosophy. In this way, we shall be brought to see how he 
understands the rise of the “humanization of nothingness” and will come 
to understand, in outline, his critique of the modern “exaltation of the 
negative.” In the remaining sections, I then show how Girard’s critique 
of the negative applies to philosophers such as Hegel, Kojève, Sartre and 
Camus. As my paper mainly expands on Deceit, Desire, and the Novel and 
Resurrection from the Underground, I will, in my conclusion, briefly touch 
on Girard’s critique of the negative in his later writings. Lastly, I will situate 
Girard’s critique of the negative within the context of his Christian way of 
thinking about death and resurrection.
The Desire for Death and Western Philosophy 
Girard argues that desire should not be defined as a straight line connect-
ing a subject to an object. Rather, our desire for the object is mediated by 
the real or apparent desire of a model (or mediator) that we imitate. In 
other words, desire is triangular; it involves a disciple (or, so to speak, the 
95Demystifying the Negative
“subject” of desire), a model that he or she imitates, and an object. In Deceit, 
Desire, and the Novel, “external mediation” refers to the context in which the 
distance separating the disciple from the model is large enough to prevent 
rivalry. In contrast, this safe distance between the disciple and the model 
no longer applies to the context of “internal mediation.” In this case, the 
disciple, by getting closer to his model or mediator, unwittingly suggests 
to the latter that it redirect its desire towards the object. It is through un-
conscious imitation that the model blocks the disciple’s way to the object. 
From this point on, the disciple’s model turns into an obstacle and may 
thus be referred to as a “model/obstacle.” The model/obstacle only makes 
the disciple’s desire for the object more vivid. And by persisting in his will 
to acquire the object, the disciple will become in turn a model/obstacle for 
his mediator. This new context is that of “double mediation.” As agents are a 
model/obstacle for each other, they gradually lose sight of the initial object 
of their rivalry. From now on, each wants “to be what the other becomes 
when he possesses this or that object.” 8 
The Dead-End of “Obstacle Addiction”
“Double mediation” is the reinforcement of people’s desire through recip-
rocal and unconscious imitation. In the end, the model/obstacle becomes 
the standard of the highest degree of intensity of desire. One’s encounter 
with a model-turned-obstacle is far from being an anecdotal experience: it 
leaves a trace that memory can hardly erase. If someone manages to defeat 
the model/obstacle, then the initial purpose of the rivalry will lose its im-
portance to them—especially since it is no longer mediated by the desire of 
a serious competitor. To them, finding further valuable objects of desire 
will amount to finding stronger model/obstacles. If, on the contrary, some-
one gets defeated by the model/obstacle, their fascination with the latter 
will only grow. Or, to put it otherwise, the disciple’s desire for the model 
constantly escalates with the model’s resistance. As the disciple’s desire 
to become like their model grows, their frustration grows too. The more 
they feel rejected by the model/obstacle, the more they admire it. Eventu-
ally, powerful feelings of admiration and hatred alternate in the disciple, 
binding them more and more strongly to their model/obstacle. One way 
or another, the quest for the model/obstacle is meant to become an ever 
stronger repetitive, mechanical and irresistible pattern. At first, my model/
obstacle is nothing other than the one who blocks my way to the object. 
8. René Girard, Battling to the End: Conversation with Benoît Chantre (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2010), 31.
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But it soon turns out that the value of objects to me strictly depends on the 
model/obstacle’s prestige. It follows that where there is something worth 
being desired, there must be a model/obstacle. The conclusion then comes 
down to the following idea: the stronger the model/obstacle, the better. 
However, given that the model/obstacle’s strength amounts to their capacity 
of blocking the disciple’s way to them, we are led even to a far more radical 
conclusion: namely, that what is the worthiest of being desired is whatever 
negates me the most. Even stronger model/obstacles than people who reject, 
despise or ignore us are obstacles deprived of human consciousness. In a 
nutshell, the ultimate obstacle is death. Indeed, as Girard puts it in Deceit, 
Desire, and the Novel: “The truth of metaphysical desire is death.” 9 The end 
of mankind’s obsession with models/obstacles can be 
found in the mineral world, the world of a death which the absence of all 
movement, of all quivering, has made complete and definitive. The hor-
rible fascination ends in the density of lead, the impenetrable immobility 
of granite. 10
Girard’s first reflections on mankind’s morbid fascination with models/
obstacles—or on what he sometimes refers to as “obstacle addiction”  11 
(manie de l’obstacle)—already contains the main features of his critique 
of Freud’s theory of the “death instinct,” 12 on which he will expand years 
later in Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. 13 Admittedly, it is 
through very complex and hardly scientific speculations that Freud comes 
to postulate the idea of a further instinct beyond the pleasure principle. But, 
more importantly, Girard notices that the hypothesis of a “death instinct” 
fails to explain the problem Freud’s essay was supposed to address in the 
first place: namely, the “compulsion to repeat.” Given that the death drive 
is defined as an “instinct to return to the inanimate state” 14 that is, as an 
instinct, strictly independent from imitation, it is hard to see how such a 
notion might account for someone’s constant repetition or reenactment 
9. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 282.
10. Ibid., 287.
11. See René Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky, trans. James 
G. Williams (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012), 81.
12. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1961).
13. See René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann 
and Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 411–5.
14. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 32.
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of painful or traumatic events. As he often does, Girard argues that Freud 
multiplies entities needlessly. Undoubtedly, for a distant observer death 
seems to be the prime and direct “existential aim” of those who repeatedly 
engage in self-destructive behavior. Accordingly, the observer is tempted 
to postulate dynamics which significantly differ from those regarded as 
usual and normal in human desire. However, in Girard’s view, what we call 
the “death drive” or “death instinct” is nothing more than a pathological 
complication stemming from the dynamics of mimetic desire. From the 
moment we know that triangular desire may develop into a destructive 
or self-destructive “obstacle addiction,” we no longer need to add further 
notions to explain such seemingly paradoxical and enigmatic phenomena 
as the “compulsion to repeat”:
The subject who is not able to decide for himself on the object that he should 
desire relies upon the desire of another person. And he automatically trans-
forms the model [of] desire into a desire that opposes and frustrates his own. 
Because he does not understand the automatic character of the rivalry, the 
imitator soon converts the very fact of being opposed, frustrated and rejected 
into the major stimulant of his desire. In one way or another, he proceeds 
to inject more and more violence into his desire. To identify this tendency 
is to recognize that, in the last resort, desire tends towards death, both the 
death of the model and obstacle (murder) and the death of the subject himself 
(self-destruction and suicide). 15 
In contrast to Freudian theories, Girard contends that the desire for death 
cannot be separated from the broader context of inter-subjective (or “inter-
individual”) relations. Even man’s desire for death is mediated by his imita-
tion of models; we must go beyond the illusion of death taken as an innate 
and direct object of desire. 16 
15. Girard, Things Hidden, 413. 
16. Note here that suicide out of physical pain or necessity is an exception to this rule. In 
this instance, self-destruction is based on need or appetite, which, in Girard’s view, are differ-
ent from mimetic desire. Some might contend that Girard’s approach is utterly reductionist. 
However, I do not regard this criticism as convincing. First, it would be too simple to dismiss 
the explanatory merits of the “obstacle-addiction” theory without any further investigation. 
Second, the theory obviously leaves room for an inquiry into psychological trauma (i.e. a 
brutal encounter with a model/obstacle may leave a more or less indelible trace on the hu-
man psyche). Third, there is no a priori reason to dismiss Girard’s bold contention according 
to which destructive and self-destructive behavior, far from being an almost unexplainable 
phenomena, entails a dynamics of desire that becomes ever more impoverished, rigid, and 
nearly automatic.
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From the Cartesian Self to the “Humanization of Nothingness” 
Aided by Girard’s writings, I will now briefly point out how modern West-
ern history has gradually paved the way to the “humanization of nothing-
ness” and the praising by philosophers of the negative. Before starting 
this brief historical inquiry, it is important to note that while, as we shall 
see, the modern Western world fosters “obstacle addiction,” it is also a 
world in which the use of physical violence is usually suppressed. Girard 
is fully aware that the pathologies inherent in “obstacle addiction” need 
not necessarily translate into acts of murder or suicide. When the use of 
violence is prohibited, most of us will vent out their envy, frustration and 
anger through more devious routes. Human psychology tends to become 
an “underground” phenomenon: that is to say, people will strive to deny 
the actual role played by the model both in their public relations and in 
their own personal lives. As Girard puts it: “All underground people care-
fully hide their imitations, even from themselves, so as not to give their 
models the psychic reward of seeing themselves imitated, not to humiliate 
themselves by being revealed as imitators.”  17 Given that “obstacle addiction” 
renders the mediator’s (or model’s) position more and more important 
and inescapable, people will use ever more refined and radical strategies 
in order not to appear as imitators to either themselves or others. Among 
many other things, this implies that human beings will also use intellectual 
means to rationalize and justify their denial of “obstacle addiction.”
Let us see how such an underground psychology has gradually come 
to permeate the history of modern Western philosophy. Girard consi ders 
Descartes (1596–1650) the founding father of Western individualism. Ad-
mittedly, Descartes’s radical doubt and cogito lay the foundations of mod-
ern philosophy by showing that what is certain and rational can only be 
grounded on our “subjective experience.” However, the gradual triumph 
of Cartesianism will raise multiple issues. To be sure, the rise of rationa-
lism frees humanity from the superstitions and beliefs that were supposed 
to explain the world they inhabit. But the other side of the coin is that 
mankind, whose only guide henceforth is his “subjective experience,” will 
have increasing trouble orienting himself in a more and more rationa-
lized and complex world. Given that the extent of what he can know for 
certain and by himself is inevitably limited, he will have to seek further 
guidance through the authority of experts—who can more or less guarantee 
that they have personally and thoroughly inquired into the issue or matter 
at stake. On the level of humanity’s attitude to knowledge, the position of 
17. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 78.
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the Cartesian self thus reinforces that of the Girardian “disciple” who can 
only orient himself or herself in the world by borrowing his or her desires 
from others. In other words, Cartesianism paves the way to a modern “cult 
of experts” which very likely leads to a general and unconscious cult of mo-
dels/obstacles of desire. 18 This will become more and more evident starting 
from the age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which put an end 
to the era of external mediation in which mankind’s spiritual and intellectual 
life was mainly based on the imitation of transcendent and culturally stable 
models. This era now gives way to that of internal mediation, “in which, at 
least in principle, individuals and communities are free to adopt whichever 
models they prefer and, better still, no model at all.”  19 On the one hand, over 
the next centuries innovation will gradually become an end in itself and 
a notion that radically excludes imitation. On the other hand, advances in 
social equality, free economic competition and technolo gy will reduce the 
distances separating individuals and thereby nurture rivalrous imitation. 
While models of desire multiply, imitation is getting more and more denied 
and concealed. Regarding Western philosophy, we may for instance notice 
that the underground psychology of rivalrous imitation will become the 
blind spot of the modern ethics of “enlightened self-interest.” Indeed, man-
kind’s obsession with models-turned-obstacles is diametrically opposed to 
the idea that holds that advancing the interests of the group and serving 
one’s own interests go hand in hand. This is well illustrated by Dostoevsky’s 
novel Notes from Underground, 20 in which the narrator is at the same time 
fascinated with those who reject him (the officer and his former colleagues 
during the school reunion) and repelled by those who are attracted to him 
(Liza, the kind prostitute). Due to his morbid obsession with obstacles, the 
narrator of the Notes is stuck at a stage where his interests, as well as those 
of others, are mutually negated. In the end, Dostoevsky’s novel offers a 
radical critique of Adam Smith’s (1723–1790) “invisible hand” as well as 
of Bentham’s (1748–1832) and Mill’s (1806–1873) utilitarianism, and the 
economic theories of “laissez faire.” In Girard’s reading of the Notes, it is 
the unacknowledged phenomenon of obstacle addiction that shows why 
18. “Our cult of experts is really one with the underground fascination for the obstacle/
model of mimetic rivalry. It verges on archaic man’s magical faith in terrifying idols. Having 
repudiated religion in order to be more rational, modern man comes full circle and, in the 
name of a superior rationality, embraces a rational and technical form of irrationality.” Ibid., 84.
19. René Girard, “Innovation and Imitation,” SubStance 19/2–3, no. 62/63 (1990): 11, 
doi:10.2307/3684663.
20. Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. Richard Pevear and 
Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
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the idea of a spontaneous harmonization between rational and egotistic 
individuals is nothing but wishful thinking. 
If the era of internal mediation comes gradually to reject the culturally 
stable and transcendent models of the past, the question of the Cartesian 
self will also change radically. In Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy, 
cogito ergo sum is the starting point of philosophy, but it is also meant to 
be inseparable from God as the cause of my existence. 21 However, once 
philosophy has got rid of the idea of God, the ever more pressing issue will 
be to determine how the Cartesian self can become, ontologically speaking, 
its own measure and foundation. Gradually, the solipsistic self will aim 
to found itself through self-affirmation: it will strive to claim, like God in 
the Old Testament, that “I AM WHO I AM” (Exodus 3:14 NSAB). 22 Girard 
contends that this tendency will become particularly conspicuous with the 
onset of post-Kantian philosophy: 
In the course of its history Western individualism took over little by little 
the prerogatives that had belonged to God in medieval philosophy. This is 
not a matter of a simple philosophical mode, a passing infatuation for the 
subjective. Since Descartes, there is no longer any point of departure except 
the cogito ergo sum. Kant succeeded for a time in keeping the Watergates 
[sic.] of subjectivism closed; he managed this with a completely arbitrary 
compromise, but the truth must out and it does so with a bang. Absolute 
idealism and Promethean thought will push Cartesianism to its extreme 
consequences.  23
In his first writings, Girard contends that an ontological deficiency, or 
“lack of being,” is integral to mankind. The disciple is always in search of 
a “fullness of being” of which he or she is deprived. “Metaphysical desire” 
is the ultimate end of triangular desire. It is a desire for the model’s only 
seemingly self-sufficient being. It rests on an adulteration of humanity’s 
desire for God, or on “deviated transcendency” (as opposed to authentic 
“vertical transcendency”). According to Girard, our longing for transcen-
dence does not vanish with the dawning of the era of internal mediation. 
On the contrary, our inescapable need for it begins by seeking “satisfaction 
21. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, 2 ed. (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 28–41.
22. “Each mode of subjectivity must found and justify the being of the real in his totality 
and affirm I am who I am.” Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 43.
23. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 42–43.
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in the human world.” 24 Traditional belief in God recedes, as human be-
ings gradually become “Gods in the eye of each other.” 25 Their desire for 
transcendence cannot be suppressed. As they turn away from the vertical 
transcendence of God and religious tradition, it becomes harder for them 
to renounce their pride. Metaphysical desire gives them the illusion that 
self-sufficiency is within their reach. 
In the age of internal mediation, humanity is ever more unconsciously 
drawn to model/obstacles. Although philosophical systems may plainly and 
simply ignore the irresistible logic of “obstacle addiction,” it will inevitably, 
and just as with the return of the repressed, manifest itself in Western 
philosophy. However, as the dynamics leading to the desire for death are 
still largely unconscious, they will not be taken for what they are. Rather, 
philosophical discourse, deluded by metaphysical desire, will turn obstacles 
of desire (including death) into features advancing mankind’s freedom or 
self-divinization. Starting with the “humanization of nothingness,” it will 
become conspicuously apparent that in the history of modern Western 
humanism, the underground psychology of “obstacle addiction,” and man-
kind’s will to become God, were bound to converge. The two main trends 
that we have briefly identified in the history of modern philosophy eventu-
ally collide with one another. Indeed, the interplay between “deviated tran-
scendence” and the pathologies inherent in mimetic desire will encourage 
a sacralizing of humanity’s desire for death. It is only in retrospect, at the 
end of a long historical process, that it will emerge that “The affirmation 
of the self ends in the negation of self. The will to make oneself God is a 
will to self-destruction which is gradually realized.” 26 
This historical overview helps us to understand the key idea of Girard’s 
critique of the negative. His main contention, indeed, is that the concept of 
the negative is the result of an unconscious process which turns obstacles 
of desire into features elevating mankind. I shall now show how we may 
uncover this process in Hegel’s philosophy. In the Master−Slave dialectic, 
as we shall see, the negative is an artefact generated by “obstacle addiction.” 
Through the concept of the negative, Hegel mistakenly turned the Slave’s 
desire for his Master (i.e. his model/obstacle) into a feature advancing the 
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The Negative, or the Desire of the Slave
Much has already been written on the differences and similarities between 
Girard’s mimetic theory and Hegel’s struggle for recognition. 27 However, 
at least to my knowledge, none of these studies have tried to make sense 
of Girard’s bold contention that “negativity … is never anything other than 
a reflection of human relationships at the level of double mediation.” 28 If 
I understand Girard correctly, he means that “negativity” is a philosophical 
concept which mistakenly turns phenomena inherent within conflictual 
human relations into something else. Now, provided we pay close attention 
to the position of the Slave in Hegel’s dialectic, we will come to realize 
that Girard’s idea makes perfect sense. Note that I do not conflate Hegel’s 
philosophy with the “humanization of nothingness.” Rather, I aim to show 
that the role played by the negative in the Master−Slave dialectic (that is, not 
in his philosophy as a whole) foreshadows the role the negative will come 
to play, more than a century later, in the “humanization of nothingness.”
Labour, Death and the Negative in the Master−Slave Dialectic 
In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the struggle to the death—which will 
eventually lead to the dialectic of Master and Slave—starts with two agents 
aiming to prove to each other that they value their “independence above 
life itself.” 29 The only way to attest this independence is to negate animal life 
or, to put it otherwise, to show another human being one’s willingness 
to sacrifice one’s own life. Henceforth, each is determined to prove their 
independence to the other through radical self-sacrifice, and this mutual 
aim will give rise to the struggle. Although they do not see that their aims 
are perfectly identical, each desires what the other desires, namely, to be 
recognized as more than a mere living organism, as more than a mere 
thing. This reciprocal desire will lead to a reciprocal violence in which 
both jointly push themselves to put their lives at risk. However, no one can 
gain recognition if the struggle ends in violent death. 30 Both agents need to 
survive because, otherwise, the negation of life would not be ascertained 
27. For an overview and critique of scholars conflating Girard and Hegel, see Andreas 
Wilmes, “Portrait of René Girard as a Post-Hegelian: Masters, Slaves, and Monstrous Dou-
bles,” The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence 1, no. 1 (2017): 57–85, doi:10.22618/
TP.PJCV.20171.1.95007. 
28. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 287–8. 
29. Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 58.
30. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), 114.
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by another human consciousness. According to the logic of what is re-
quired for there to be recognition, someone has to cling to his or her life 
and abandon the struggle. One of the agents, the Slave, will have stepped 
back during the conflict, while the other, the Master, will not have given 
up on putting their life at substantial risk. From this point on, we enter a 
new relation in which the Slave works for the Master’s enjoyment. At first, 
the Master believes that they have achieved recognition, while the slave 
regards himself or herself as inessential. 
Even so, Hegel would show that the Master−Slave relation is, in fact, 
quite the opposite of what it seems. It turns out that the Master is dependent 
on the Slave’s work. In addition, the Master does not achieve authentic 
recognition, since the Slave has been reduced to the rank of an object, 
whose recognition thus cannot be regarded by the Master as proof of their 
purportedly essential independence from natural life. In contrast, the Slave 
has experienced something far more significant than the Master: it is they 
who backed down during the struggle, after having been faced with the 
possibility of their own death. As Hegel put it: 
For this consciousness [the Slave] has been fearful, not of this or that particular 
thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; 
for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that experience 
it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and 
everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But this pure 
universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is the 
simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-
for-self, which consequently is implicit in this consciousness. 31 
At first glance, it seems that the Slave, in contrast to the Master, has failed 
to prove their independence. But this is only true if we analyze the situa-
tion in a superficial way. If we take a closer look, Hegel argues, we notice 
that the Slave, by experiencing the possibility of their own death, envisages 
their own nothingness. Paradoxically, the Slave goes beyond animal life by 
preserving it. They have proved to be more than a mere living organism, 
because their experience of death made them see themself as “Nothingness 
maintained in Being.” 32 This experience of “absolute negativity” is pivotal. 
Admittedly, the Slave also gains independence by serving and working for 
the Master. Through being in the service of their Master they learn to delay 
31. Ibid., 117.
32. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 48.
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the satisfaction of their own desires, as opposed to engaging in the mere 
activity of consumption, in which objects of desire constantly reappear, 
and which only serves to show mankind’s dependence on nature. Given 
that they transform the objects around them for their Master’s enjoyment, 
they give form and content to their negating activity. However, if the slave 
were not laboring out of fear, their freedom would not be universal, but 
rather limited to the particular talents they make use of to satisfy their 
Master. Fear of death without labor is a universal but abstract freedom: 
it is a freedom without any form or content. Labor minus the fear of death 
is, strictly, just a particular freedom, deprived of all universality. Without 
that fear, the Slave would not come to understand that their freedom goes 
beyond the specific activities they are performing here and now for their 
Master. As Houlgate puts it:
If … the slave labours out of fear and the accompanying experience of himself 
as pure negativity, he can regard any particular activity as the particular, 
concrete expression of his universal freedom from, and freedom to negate and 
transform, everything given and determinate around him, or what Hegel calls 
his “universal formative activity.” Accordingly, he will understand himself to 
be capable of all kinds of labour and not to be dependent on, or slave to, any 
one of them. 33 
Thus, Hegel always sought to stress the idea that the Master−Slave dialectic 
is completed if, and only if, the fear of death and labor are deeply bound 
together.
The Negative as “the Herald of Slavery and Death”
From a Girardian perspective, the Hegelian struggle to the death is utterly 
mimetic. The rivalry escalates because each imitates the disregard for life 
that the other displays. Gradually, each comes to see in the other the ob-
stacle to their affirmation of independence over life. The struggle very likely 
leads to death, given that the opponents are nothing more than “obstacle 
addicts” who are incapable of recognizing that they are the same. If the 
Master manages to prevail over the Slave, then the latter is no longer an 
obstacle. It is therefore right to conclude, as Hegel does, that the victory 
of the Master is a double-edged one: as soon as the Slave is no longer an 
33. Stephen Houlgate, Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2005), 70.
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obstacle, the Master can no longer consider the Slave proof of his or her 
own independence. 
However, the Master is still an obstacle to the Slave. So, should we con-
clude, like Hegel, that there is some experience of “absolute negativity” 
beyond the Slave’s relation to their model/obstacle? That goes to the heart 
of the matter. Hegel’s depiction of the struggle is notoriously abstract, 
insofar as we barely know anything about the opponents and the kind of 
violence they use. We do not know whether the rivals differ in age, strength, 
intelligence, etc. Moreover, we do not know if they fight with their fists, 
with weapons of opportunity, by showing skill, by using their tactical 
mind, etc. This lack of more concrete information about the conflict in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit plays an important rhetorical role, in that 
it somehow puts the reader’s mind to sleep and encourages him or her to 
accept the seemingly most plausible, general, and radical conclusion of the 
Slave submitting to their Master out of fear of death. Yet, common sense 
shows us that many other conflict scenarios are possible. I may surrender 
because I am out of breath and no longer have enough strength to fight. 
I may abandon the conflict because I can no longer endure my pain and 
suffering. It is also possible that I be forced to recognize that my opponent 
is stronger and smarter than me. Or maybe I am stronger and smarter 
than my opponent, but it turns out that he has been luckier than me. After 
all, there is always a certain degree of contingency in conflicts that may 
work in favor of one or the other of the two opponents … In his analysis of 
Hegel’s dialectic, Marquet notes in passing that the Master, contrary to the 
Slave, was not perceptive and smart enough to sense danger. According to 
Marquet, we can even go so far as to say that the Master “did not have the 
courage to be afraid, to face death, to comprehend what death means.” 34 
Nonetheless, as we just saw, it is also possible to imagine that neither the 
Master, nor the Slave had the courage to face death. It is also conceivable 
that both the Slave and the Master experienced fear of death at nearly the 
same time, but, by a fortunate coincidence, the Slave was the first to show 
their submission to the other. In the end, it is even conceivable that only the 
Master truly faced death—that it was through their fear of death that they 
found the strength and willingness to survive and defeat their opponent.
Among many other conflict scenarios, Hegel chooses to favor only one. 
His scenario is no more and no less likely than any other. It neither directly 
34. “ … il [le maître] n’a pas eu le courage d’avoir peur, de voir la mort en face et 
d’appréhender ce qu’elle signifie.” Jean-François Marquet, Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de 
l’esprit de Hegel (Paris: Ellipses, 2009), 100.
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follows from some form of logical necessity, nor from some empirical law. 
But it could be argued that Hegel focused on the only scenario involving a 
universal philosophical lesson concerning death, labor and freedom. This 
argument would only be convincing if we could show that Hegel’s account 
of the Slave’s fear of death is perfectly accurate. Unfortunately, though, 
we are in a position to raise serious doubts about the idea that the Slave 
could learn something about their own freedom through their fear of death. 
To be sure, the Slave did not contemplate death in abstracto (i.e. realizing 
that everything comes to an end, that all of us will die some day). Rather, 
they were afraid of being killed by their opponent. Their fear was a fear of 
violent death, inseparable from the Master. Indeed, it is the concrete threat 
represented by the Master that, in the eyes of the Slave, shook “everything 
solid and stable … to its foundations.” 35 Moreover, the Slave supposedly ex-
perienced “the absolute melting-away of everything stable” 36 while staying 
alive only because the Master decided not to kill him. The idea of animal 
life negated and preserved at the same time is what best defines, from the 
point of view of the Slave, the Master’s power over life and death. The Slave 
sees themself as nothing, precisely because the Master is everything to 
them. In other words, life being simultaneously suppressed and preserved 
corresponds to the Slave’s experience of the Master as a model/obstacle. 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, we move from this entirely intersubjec-
tive experience to the Slave’s private and universal experience of their 
own mortality, through which they contemplate “absolute negativity” and 
thereby realize their “essential nature [consisting] of self-consciousness.” 37 
Henceforth, several issues arise. The first problem is that we cannot be 
entirely sure whether Hegel’s account of the Slave’s experience of death 
should be taken for granted. Admittedly, the Slave did envision that their 
whole life might come to an end. However, this need not necessarily imply 
that they experienced the “absolute melting-away of everything stable.” 38 
In instances of extreme survival, physiological responses are usually very 
specific, the threat to life is perceived very distinctly, people have strong 
thoughts about their dearest relatives, all their life passes before their eyes. 
These experiences are very different from that of “absolute negativity.” 
Furthermore, one may prefer to define the fear of death as a fear of the 
Unknown, rather than defining it in terms of “negativity.” In any case, there 





will always be an unbridgeable gap between experiencing the possibility of 
one’s own death and experiencing death as “absolute negativity.” Bataille 
is surely right when he contends that nothing can “reveal to the living the 
invasion of death.” As he puts it, Hegel’s conception of negativity leads us 
to the idea of an experience that is always already impossible to achieve 
in human terms: 
The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, in fact, reveals 
nothing. In theory, it is his natural, animal being whose death reveals Man 
to himself, but the revelation never takes place. For when the animal being 
supporting him dies, the human being himself ceases to be. In order for Man 
to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but he would 
have to do it while living—watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, 
death itself would have to become (self-) consciousness at the very moment 
that it annihilates the conscious being. 39
Given that death is a non-rationalizable and non-objectifiable phenomenon, 
we may indeed wonder whether it could really play a role in Hegel’s dialec-
tic. What is more, death per se does not occur in Hegel’s conflict scenario. 
As is shown by Bataille, Hegel’s problematic idea of self-consciousness as 
“Nothingness maintained in Being” may somehow apply to a more radical 
scenario, namely that of a human being’s identifying with the sacrificial vic-
tim he or she is putting to death. (Moreover, we should note in passing here 
that sacrificing the other, and religion, play absolutely no role in Hegel’s 
Master−Slave dialectic). Although negativity does not truly manifest itself 
in sacrifice, either—this still being just “negativity” in scare-quotes, so to 
speak—it nonetheless comes closer to the idea of mankind staying alive 
while seeing the “absolute negativity” of death at work. 
In the end, the negative is nothing more than a distorted image of man’s 
fascination with models/obstacles. At first, Hegel’s depiction of the struggle 
to the death is very close to the logic of “obstacle addiction.” During the 
struggle, opponents aim to become an ever-stronger obstacle to each other. 
This increasing obsession with the other (the model/obstacle) ultimately 
leads to destruction and death unless one of the opponents surrenders. And 
it is at this very moment that Hegel aims to conjure away the inescapable 
logic of “obstacle addiction.” The Phenomenology of Spirit invites us to 
believe that fear of death and labour show the Slave’s independence with 
respect to animal life, and advance his or her freedom. However, although 
39. Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” 19.
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we may of course pity the Slave, it turns out that their situation makes 
them no freer than the Master. The only significant difference between 
the struggle to the death and the Lordship− Bondage dialectic is that the 
latter is an asymmetrical relation. In this latter context, the Slave sup-
presses their violence, and their ambivalent feelings towards their Master 
are thereby repressed. From this point on, Hegel’s dialectical solution does 
nothing more than express the underground psychology of the Slave—or, 
to put it differently, the Slave’s resentment. “Nothingness maintained in 
Being” ultimately corresponds to the power over life and death that the 
Slave believes they are seeing in their Master. It corresponds to the Slave’s 
experience of the model/obstacle—to what the Slave desires, not what the 
Slave actually is. Hegel thereby turns the mimetic desire of the Slave into 
a strictly individual feature that will characterize the Slave, like freedom as 
such. The arbitrary dismissal of the model of desire (i.e. the Master) shows 
that negativity is nothing more than a symptom of a repressed fascination 
with obstacles. In Hegel’s struggle for recognition, the negative turns out 
to be an illusory by-product of intersubjective and conflictual relations of 
desire. The negative is the desire of the Slave. And both Slave and Master 
are similar insofar as they depend on the unconscious dynamics of obstacle 
addiction. That is why, according to Girard, the negative can never serve to 
prove that mankind is independent or free: “The Negative which so many 
modem philosophers identify with freedom and life is in reality the herald 
of slavery and death.” 40
The Drama of the “Humanization of Nothingness”
More than a century would pass between Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1807) and the first publication of Alexandre Kojève’s Lectures on the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit in France (1947). During the nineteenth century, it 
became obvious how deeply “deviated transcendency” permeates Western 
philosophy. In France, Auguste Comte (1798–1857) would aim to replace 
traditional religion with his positivist “Religion of humanity.” In Germany, 
Nietzsche (1844–1900) would introduce the Übermensch as a way of over-
coming the “death of God” and Christian “slave morality.” Meanwhile, 
Left Hegelians such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), who very likely 
influenced Kojève, would contend that God is nothing more than a human 
projection. Humanity was supposed to overcome its alienation through 
religion by reclaiming its own attributes mistakenly granted to God.
40. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. 
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Two world wars would subsequently undermine humanistic ideals, but 
humanism has still not yet come to an end. This is not unrelated to the 
phenomenon of technological growth, for through technology, human be-
ings seem to have finally built an environment which is entirely their own; 
more than ever, they appear like “masters and possessors of nature.” That, 
in turn, translates into an expansion of material comfort, but also into new 
means of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons. At first glance, the 
rise of the technological society offers a compelling illustration of Kojève’s 
conception of the negative. Prima facie, mankind appears as the being who 
realizes its freedom by transcending and negating the given. First, it negates 
nature by assimilating it to its own needs. Second, its weapons endow it 
with a power over the life and death of its entire species—that is, with the 
real possibility of negating mankind as a whole. In the end, the negative 
does not appear solely as the expression of humanity’s freedom: it seems 
to correspond to the latter’s god-like features. Yet at bottom, the negative 
remains a symptom of mankind’s obsession with model/obstacles of desire. 
Man: A “Nothingness that Nihilates”
Through his very influential and rather controversial reading of Hegel, 
Kojève radicalizes the concept of the negative. First, “deviated transcen-
dency” is definitely at work in his philosophy. While Hegel aimed to show 
how God actualizes Himself through World History, Kojève unambiguously 
states that World History is the development of mankind’s divine nature. 
The following quote from Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
clearly shows that, as noted by Girard, modern individualism aims to take 
over “the prerogatives that had belonged to God in medieval philosophy” 41: 
Christian Man can really become what he would like to be only by becoming 
a man without God—or, if you will, a God-Man. He must realize in himself 
what at first he thought was realized in his God. To be really Christian, he 
himself must become Christ. 42 
In Kojève, the historical process through which humanity re-appropriates 
the attributes it mistakenly granted to God is based on an anthropological 
reading of Hegel’s Master−Slave dialectic. It is only once the struggle for 
41. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 42.
42. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 67. Kojève further states that “it is sufficient 
to say of Man everything that the Christian says of his God in order to move from the absolute 
or Christian Theology to Hegel’s absolute philosophy or Science.” Ibid., 73. 
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recognition has been resolved that Human History is fully achieved. Girard 
himself acknowledged that Kojève had influenced him somewhat when he 
wrote Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. 43 Many scholars have already tried to 
point out the similarities between Girard’s mimetic theory and Kojève’s 
conception of the struggle for recognition. 44 Yet I think that the common-
alities between Girard and Kojève are most often overstated 
Admittedly, Kojève understands the struggle for recognition in terms of 
“a desire for the other’s desire.” 45 Each wants their human worth to be rec-
ognized by the other. That is to say, each wants to be desired by the other 
as a properly free being. The desire for the other’s desire of independence 
is what sparks the struggle. Given that desire is mediated by the desire of 
the other, there are indeed some insights in Kojève that seem to anticipate 
Girard’s conception of mimetic desire. 46 However, Girard’s theory is not 
about “a desire for the other’s desire,” but rather about “a desire for what the 
other possesses” 47 or, put otherwise, a “desire according to that of another.” 48 
What is more, Kojève’s theory of desire is not mimetic at heart. Accord-
ing to Kojève, desire is based on mankind’s ability to transcend the given. 
Desire is essentially a power to negate that sets humanity apart from the 
Animal. While the natural world is characterized by an identity which is 
always equal to itself (i.e. this thing is nothing more and nothing less than 
this thing), human beings are not what they are, and are what they are not. 
In Kojève, human desire is deeply bound to freedom and nothingness. It 
43. Girard, Battling to the End, 30.
44. See Eugene Webb, The Self Between. From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), 116; George Erving, “René Girard and the 
Legacy of Alexandre Kojeve,” Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 10 (Spring 
2003): 111–25, doi:10.1353/ctn.2003.0002; Guy Vanheeswijck, “The Place of René Girard in 
Contemporary Philosophy,” Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 10 (Spring 
2003): 98, doi:10.1353/ctn.2003.0004; Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master, trans. 
Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 254.
45. Girard, Battling to the End, 30. 
46. For instance, Kojève’s contention that “Desire directed toward a natural object is hu-
man only to the extent that it is ‘mediated’ by the Desire of another directed toward the 
same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it. Thus, an object 
perfectly useless from the biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy’s flag) can 
be desired because it is the object of other desires. Such a Desire can only be a human Desire, 
and human reality, as distinguished from animal reality, is created only by action that satis-
fies such Desires: human history is the history of desired Desires.” Kojève, Introduction to the 
Reading of Hegel, 6. See also Erving, “René Girard and the Legacy of Alexandre Kojeve,” 111–25.
47. Girard, Battling to the End, 30.
48. Wolfgang Palaver, René Girard’s Mimetic Theory, trans. Gabriel Borrud (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2013), 119.
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is thanks to mankind’s capacity to negate as a desiring being that histori-
cal becoming is made possible. If a human being were not a “negating,” it 
would be nothing more than a “static and given being” 49 belonging to the 
realm of animal life. As Kojève puts it: “Man is not a Being that is in an 
eternal identity to itself in Space, but a Nothingness that nihilates.” 50 In the 
end, desire, death and freedom are equivalent: 
Man is a (free) Individual only to the extent that he is mortal, and he can realize 
and manifest himself as such an Individual only by realizing and manifesting 
Death as well. 51
Kojève further adds: 
In fine, then, human death does indeed present itself as a “manifestation” of 
Man’s freedom, individuality, and historicity—that is, of the “total” or dia-
lectical character of his being and his existence. More particularly, death is 
an “appearance” of Negativity, which is the genuine motor of the dialectical 
movement. 52 
Here, we are touching on an unsolvable contradiction. On the one hand, 
Kojève is bound to maintain the dialectical spirit of Hegel’s philosophy—
which, primarily, is about reconciliation between the finite and the infinite, 
mankind and God. On the other hand, his definition of desire is incompat-
ible with any form of dialectical thinking: if mankind is what it desires, 
and if desire is pure negativity, how could it make its freedom its own? At 
bottom, it would have to follow its desire for death to the end: attaining 
its freedom would amount to losing it. Kojève wrote that History is about 
humans creating their own reality, and that this process is only completed 
once the Master−Slave dialectic is overcome through authentic and uni-
versal reciprocal recognition. However, given Kojève’s definition of desire, 
we can see that recognition is always already bound to fail. To be sure, 
I may desire the desire of the other insofar as only another human being 
is capable of expressing its will to transcend the given (the natural world) 
through negation. Yet, the other will never become a mirror showing me the 
49. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 5.
50. Ibid., 48.
51. Ibid., 251. “Man’s freedom and individuality indeed presuppose his death.” Ibid., 252. 
52. Ibid., 253. Kojève also states that “Death and Freedom are but two (‘phenomenologi-
cal’) aspects of one and the same thing, so that to say ‘mortal’ is to say ‘free,’ and inversely.” 
Ibid., 247.
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pure negativity that defines me. Pure negativity is nothing more than my 
fascination with an obstacle that could prove capable of destroying me. One 
can never appropriate pure negativity. Hence, we can only conclude that: 
If strictly human Desire is the desire that desires itself as desire of nothing, 
then man can never take his proper place except as desire of himself, as im-
possible desire of himself. “Man” was the name of the impossible. Man is not 
in man, he is always beyond himself. 53
In Hegel, the negative was the philosophical artifact of the Slave’s fascina-
tion with their model/obstacle, their Master. However, the negative was also 
part of a dialectical process about the self-reflection of life. Moreover, the 
Master−Slave dialectic marks an early stage within the Phenomenology of 
Spirit: the German philosopher’s conception of freedom goes well beyond 
the idea of a mere liberty to negate. Last but not least, Hegel offered a 
speculative philosophy regarding the Christian Revelation which, however 
we interpret it, cannot be reduced to mere individualism. With Kojève, the 
negative remains an artifact of mankind’s fascination with model/obstacles, 
but the scope of the concept is becoming much broader and more extreme. 
The negative now defines humanity as a free being who is essentially 
different from the natural world. Furthermore, the negative becomes the 
principle of mankind’s self-formation through History. It is thanks to its 
power to negate that mankind takes the place of God. Ultimately, the nega-
tive becomes a strictly individualistic and non-dialectical concept.
From a historical perspective, we have reached the stage where, as Girard 
puts it, “The affirmation of the self ends in the negation of the self. The 
will to make oneself God is a will to self-destruction which is gradually 
realized.” 54 With the gradual amplification of internal mediation, stable 
and transcendent models are receding as models of desire multiply. At the 
same time, “underground psychology” is taking the lead and compelling 
philosophical discourse to conceal the actual role played by models of de-
sire in the formation of the self. Mimetic desire is becoming ever harder to 
dissimulate, so that philosophical individualism/humanism must use ever 
more radical strategies of self-deception. In their vain attempt to bypass 
the mimetic reality of the human world, human beings may pretend that 
they no longer desire anything, or that their desires, unlike those of their 
fellow beings, are utterly spontaneous and authentic. Kojève’s strategy is 
53. Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master, 20.
54. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 287.
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even more radical, insofar as he contends that humanity may express its 
most essential freedom and desire in its self-destruction. Purportedly, since 
mankind can die, or put its life at substantial risk, out of sheer pride (as 
demonstrated by the Hegelian struggle for recognition), its power to negate 
makes it inimitable. The actual role played by the mediator is immediately 
ruled out by Kojève’s definition of desire as pure negativity. Desire is only 
mimetic in a rather secondary way—that is, inasmuch as individuals enter 
the circle of reciprocal violence through their attempt to prove the extent 
of their power to negate to one another. That is why Girard argues that 
“The exaltation of the negative is rooted in … blind lucidity.” 55 There is some 
form of lucidity in the philosophical praising of the negative, insofar as it 
reveals the ultimate end of individualism in the age of internal mediation. 
The ever-constant stubbornness in not acknowledging the role played 
by the mediator of desire leads the individual to literally expel himself from 
human reality. The individual’s refusal to renounce its pride ends with its 
self-destruction. Nevertheless, this lucidity is “blind” insofar as it entirely 
reverses the chronological sequence of mimetic desire. With the “exaltation 
of the negative,” the very last stage of “obstacle addiction” is turned into 
a first principle concerning the nature of mankind’s desire and freedom. 
But in fact, imitation comes first, and “negativity” is nothing other than 
the outcome of unacknowledged mimetic rivalries. “Negativity” is a quali-
ty one believes one can see in the model/obstacle of desire, and that one 
vainly aims to appropriate. 
Incidentally, Girard’s critique also applies to Sartre’s existentialism. Like 
Kojève, Sartre’s philosophical framework rests on a strictly dualistic ontolo-
gy. He distinguishes between the in-itself (en soi) and the for-itself. 56 To put 
it briefly, the in-itself refers to things or non-conscious beings belonging to 
the animal world. It is characterized by self-identity. By contrast, the for-
itself refers to human consciousness, which is non-identical to itself. In a 
similar vein to Kojève, Sartre relates this lack of self-identity of conscious-
ness to humanity’s unlimited freedom, which is nothing more than their 
inborn power to negate the given. Like Girard, Sartre states that human 
beings have a desire for being. As mankind is both in-itself and for-itself, its 
nature is essentially ambiguous. The human being is torn between being and 
nothingness, and will vainly strive to achieve self-identity (i.e. to become in-
itself-for-itself), especially given that its fellow beings tend to objectify it (i.e. 
55. Ibid. 
56. See, especially, Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Washington Square Press, 1993).
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they deny its nature as a for-itself). My point here is not to understate—as, 
unfortunately, all too often happens—Sartre’s influence on Girard’s early 
writings. 57 I mainly want to point out that the in-itself/for-itself distinction 
is incompatible with Girard’s way of thinking. For, in Sartre’s existentialism, 
the negative is taken as a constitutive trait of human consciousness rather 
than a by-product of mimetic desire, a symptom pointing to our relation 
with models/obstacles of desire. As Girard puts it: “The massive and dumb 
en-soi [in-itself] which the pour-soi [for-itself] always denies, is actually the 
obstacle that the masochist avidly seeks and on which he remains fixed.” 58 
Which means that the absolute power to negate is not a feature that we 
possess but a feature we believe we are seeing and covet in the other. 
Years later, in 2008, Girard would maintain his criticism of Sartre’s 
existen tialism. He sought to further explicate his main disagreement with 
French existentialism, which pertained to the pivotal thesis according to 
which “existence precedes essence.” In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre 
explained this core idea as follows: 
What do we mean here by “existence precedes essence”? We mean that man 
first exists: he materializes in the world, encounters himself, and only after-
ward defines himself. If man as existentialists conceive of him cannot be 
defined, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until 
later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human 
nature since there is no God to conceive of it. 59
Existence is thus deeply bound up with negation and nothingness. Essence 
only comes into play later, when the human being defines itself through its 
actions, or through the models (essences) it identifies with. For instance, the 
garçon de café identifies with the essence of the waiter. 60 However, from an 
57. Girard acknowledges Sartre’s influence on him in La conversion de l’art (Paris: Flam-
marion, 2010), 19–20. According to Girard, Sartre’s influence on him had been even more 
important than Hegel’s. For interesting studies pertaining to Girard and Sartre, see Robert 
Doran, “René Girard’s Concept of Conversion and the ‘Via Negativa’: Revisiting ‘Deceit, Desire, 
and the Novel,’” Religion & Literature 43, no. 3 (2011): 170–79; Claudio Tarditi, “Manque d’être, 
désir et liberté: pour une comparaison entre Jean-Paul Sartre et René Girard,” Le Philosophoire 2, 
no. 23 (2004): 238–51, doi:10.3917/phoir.023.0238.
58. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 288.
59. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007), 22. Emphasis mine. 
60. “Let us consider this waiter in the cafe. His movement is quick and forward, a little 
too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He 
bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous 
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existential perspective, the garçon de café is primarily a free being, that is, a 
“nothingness that nihilates.” Sartre argues that the garçon de café, in imitating 
the gestures and attitudes of the waiter in an almost mechanical way (“in 
playing at being a waiter in a café”), is acting in bad faith: that is to say, the 
garçon de café is not acting in an authentic way—he is deceiving himself in 
believing he is waiter, and is thereby repudiating his original and existential 
freedom. Now, in Girard’s view, Sartre’s account is problematic in at least 
two respects. First, by defining existence in terms of negativity, Sartre “aims 
to purify existence of otherness in full” 61 [“Sartre veut purifier l’existence de 
toute altérité”]. To Girard, this philosophical claim is wrong, since the other 
and imitation always already permeate man’s existence. Second, by defin-
ing existential freedom in terms of negativity, Sartre is compelled to equate 
mimesis with original sin. The mere fact that the garçon de café imitates those 
who worked as waiters before him is already a sign of inauthenticity and 
repudiated freedom. According to Girard, Sartre’s conception of bad faith is, 
morally speaking, wrongheaded and too demanding. 62 For imitation is not 
a sin per se. Mimesis is often positive, in that it helps individuals to orient 
themselves in the world they inhabit, to build their skills and knowledge, 
and furthers good reciprocity (mutual assistance, politeness, love, friendship, 
etc.). Men are only sinful when they start aiming to acquire the being of the 
model they imitate (pride, envy, resentment, jealousy etc.). Furthermore, to 
Girard, freedom and imitation are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, 
freedom rests on the conscious imitation of positive models of desire. This 
is a major point of disagreement between Girard and the philosophical 
proponents of the “humanization of nothingness.” 63
for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflex-
ible stiffness of some kind of automaton while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a 
tightrope-walker.… All his behavior seems to us a game… But what is he playing? We need 
not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe.” Sartre, 
Being and Nothingness, 101–2.
61. Girard, La conversion de l’art, 20. For a good commentary of Girard’s critique of Sartre, 
see Doran, “René Girard’s Concept of Conversion,” 174–6.
62. Girard, La conversion de l’art, 20. With regards to the garçon de café, Girard argues that 
Sartre creates an untrue and counter-intuitive moral dilemma [“La notion de mauvaise foi 
crée un dilemme moral qui n’a aucune vérité.”]. Indeed, if we followed Sartre, we would have 
to blame virtually everyone who imitates a model in order to learn their job.
63. Drawing on Payerson’s writings, Tarditi shows that whereas Sartre defends a strictly 
negative conception of human freedom (libertas minor), Girard defends a conception of 
freedom as libertas maior. To Girard, freedom does not merely rest on the absence of external 
constraints. Rather, freedom is the positive choice of non-violence and good mimesis. On my 
reading, Tarditi’s remarks also generally apply to Girard’s critique of the “humanization of 
nothingness.” See Tarditi, “Manque d’être,” 238–51. 
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The Myth of the “Superior Suicide”
The modern “exaltation of the negative” fails to recognize that mankind 
will always aim to fulfill its need for transcendence at any cost. The glori-
fication of the negative has nothing to do with what the negative is per se. 
Rather, in a world devoid of vertical transcendence, the negative appears 
as the last illusory form of absolute for the religion of individualism. “Ob-
stacle addiction” gradually leads to the idea that what is most desirable is 
what negates me the most. And it must be added here that self-destructive 
behavior is very likely to be equated with the idea of a self-sufficient in-
dividual. A suicide carried out without external constraints, as freely as 
possible, may appear as the highest example of mankind’s sovereign power 
to negate. Through such an act, the human being would seem to entirely 
appropriate its negativity. It would thereby seem to demonstrate that its 
power to nihilate only depends on itself. Through its capacity to transcend 
its own life by suppressing it, it would then show that the power granted 
to the Christian God is actually limited, and that humanity itself is God. 
By carrying out a free suicide, mankind would achieve its biggest victory, 
through its own defeat. Hence Kojève’s claim that:
suicide, or voluntary death without any “vital necessity,” is the most obvious 
“manifestation” of Negativity or Freedom. 64 
Nevertheless, the philosophical praise of the negative, when pushed to 
such extremes, is nothing more than an illusion generated by the combined 
effects of “obstacle addiction” and “deviated transcendency.” Free suicide 
is a contradictory idea because even such a radical act of self-destruction 
involves a mediator or model of desire. In this instance, the human being 
does not acknowledge that they are drawn by an irresistible delusion that 
they will become divine by becoming a model/obstacle. They do not see 
that the transcendence they would like to achieve for themself is always 
already beyond them. For this transcendence is never a quality they may 
ultimately possess: it is the illusory by-product of their rivalrous imitation 
of the other. In fact, free suicide is pure madness, it is an obsession with 
the model/obstacle leading to death. 
For Girard, this is best illustrated by the character of Kirilov in Dosto-
evsky’s masterpiece Demons. 65 Kirilov wants to kill himself in order to 
64. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 247. 
65. Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Peaver and Larissa Volokhonsky 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
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become God. Mankind’s ability to willingly take its own life will supposedly 
show that it can fully embrace its own finitude. Then, by having proved 
that it can be self-sufficient and finite at the same time, it will finally be 
able to do away with the illusory transcendence of the Christian religion. 
Kirilov is certain that his theory is true. At first, it seems that the mere 
idea of freedom guaranteed by suicide should be enough. But humanity 
is still too much enslaved by its fear of the afterlife and of physical pain. 
Someone needs to enlighten mankind about the freedom it already pos-
sesses here and now. Kirilov will therefore put his theory into practice. He 
will purportedly kill himself without fearing death (since acknowledging 
his finitude amounts to acknowledging his freedom) and out of love for 
humanity (since his fellow beings must learn to recognize and enjoy the 
freedom that they already possess). In the end, he will be the main actor 
and messenger of the new religion of atheistic humanism.
Then, the man who showed mankind the road to attain its supreme freedom 
will ascend the empty throne of God, while God, the author and idea of pain 
and fear, will disappear. But to accomplish this great cosmic transformation, 
man must show his defiance of God and his total insubordination in a con-
scious self-annihilation. 66
In Dostoevsky’s novel, Kirilov’s project turns out to be a gruesome and 
tragic failure. Before taking his life, he writes a false letter declaring his 
responsibility for the murder of Shatov. In practical terms, Kirilov’s suicide 
mainly serves the interests of the political projects of Verkhovensky and 
Stavrogin. After handing his letter to Verkhovensky, he commits suicide in 
an atmosphere of fear, anger, and madness. Verkhovensky sees the terror on 
Kirilov’s face and hears him screaming like a beast. Before Kirilov shoots 
himself in the head, he yells at Verkhovensky and bites his finger until it 
bleeds. One could sum up the failure of Kirilov’s project by saying that, 
after all, he showed that he was afraid to die and was therefore incapable of 
fully embracing its finitude. However, Kojève argues that Kirilov managed 
to demonstrate his freedom nonetheless, by deciding to kill himself for an 
arbitrary and purely human reason, namely shame: 
Kirilov wants to commit suicide solely in order to demonstrate the possibil-
ity of doing it “without any necessity”—that is, freely. His suicide is intended 
66. Ervin C. Brody, “Dostoevsky’s Kirilov in Camus’s ‘Le Mythe de Sisyphe,’” The Modern 
Language Review 70, no. 2 (1975): 292, doi:10.2307/3724282.
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to demonstrate the absolute freedom of man—that is, his independence in 
relation to God. Dostoevsky’s theistic objection consists in saying that man 
cannot do it, that he necessarily shrinks from death: Kirilov commits suicide 
out of shame for not being able to do it. But this objection is not valid, because 
a suicide “out of shame” is also a free act (no animal does it). And if, by com-
mitting suicide, Kirilov annihilates himself he has, as he wished, overcome 
the omnipotence of the external (the “transcendent”) by dying “prematurely,” 
before it “was written,” and has limited infinity or God. 67 
Shame does not imply a vital necessity of killing oneself. Therefore, com-
mitting suicide out of shame could still be taken as a purely free act of 
self-destruction. But this objection does not apply to Girard’s interpreta-
tion of Dostoevsky’s novel. As he argues, Kirilov’s model/obstacle is Christ 
Himself: 
The death of this possessed person must put an end to the Christian era, but 
at the same time it intends to be very much like, yet radically different from 
the passion of Christ. Kirilov is so convinced of the metaphysical efficacy 
of his gesture that he is indifferent to all publicity: Quidquid latet apparebit 
(Whatever is hidden will appear).… He does not imitate Christ, he parodies 
him. He does not seek to collaborate in the work of redemption but to correct 
it. Underground ambivalence is here borne to the highest degree of intensity 
and spiritual meaning, for the rival who is simultaneously venerated and hated 
is the Redeemer himself. To the humble imitation of Jesus Christ is opposed 
the prideful and satanic imitation of the possessed. 68
Kirilov’s shame betrays his rivalrous imitation of Christ. Given that the 
Passion of Christ brought forth the lies of the resurrection and the afterlife, 
Kirilov contends that a more perfect and enlightening death is needed, a 
death that would teach human beings to be perfectly content with their 
finitude. Kirilov wants to appropriate the divine being of Christ. But the 
closer he comes to the act of suicide, the more he realizes that, just like 
Christ on the cross, he is experiencing his own moment of doubt. His first 
failure to calmly and spontaneously become one with his own finitude 
leads to his sense of shame, and makes the divinity he wants to usurp 
from Christ even more inaccessible—and desirable—to him. Now, the more 
67. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 248.
68. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 50. See also Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the 
Novel, 275–8. 
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Kirilov persists in not renouncing his pride, the more his model will reflect 
his actual lack of self-sufficiency. In the end, Kirilov’s suicide is not at all 
“the most obvious ‘manifestation’ of Negativity or Freedom.” 69 Kirilov kills 
himself out of self-hatred: “His suicide is an ordinary suicide.” 70 There is 
no trace of an active freedom to negate in Kirilov’s tragic death. In this 
instance, negativity appears as the most acute symptom of a relation to the 
model/obstacle, a symptom that becomes unbearable. It is the concrete and 
increasing negation of himself experienced in front of his model/obstacle 
that Kirilov has internalized. It is because his rivalrous imitation confronted 
him with an insufferable feeling of emptiness that he expelled himself from 
the human world.
In the Myth of Sisyphus, Camus made Kirilov into one of his philosophi-
cal heroes. As shown by the theater adaptation of Dostoevsky’s Demons 71 
that he completed shortly before his death, his admiration for this tragic 
character remained constant. He always claimed that the tension between 
human reasoning and the silence and meaninglessness of the world must 
be maintained. The human being must live out its absurd condition, rather 
than trying to escape it through suicide. However, he also believed that 
Kirilov’s theory introduced a “superior” and “pedagogical” form of suicide. 
Through his revolt against God and Christianity’s arbitrary conception of 
grace and justice in an afterlife, Kirilov would teach mankind to be aware 
of the absurd. Camus defended Kirilov’s theory against Dostoevsky. In his 
opinion, Dostoevsky had shrunk from the tough consequences of Kirilov’s 
reasoning and opted to seek an easy (and perhaps not that sincere) refuge 
in Christian faith. Camus takes some liberties with the rules of literary 
criticism in order to vindicate his thesis. 72 In order to further his argument, 
he inverts the chronological sequence of Dostoevsky’s writings (especially 
regarding the Demons and the Diary of a Writer). Also, he “completely 
disregards all the gory details of Kirilov’s death in Dostoevsky’s version 
and merely states that he kills himself.” 73 Moreover, he forgets to mention 
that Dostoevsky introduces Kirilov as a mentally unstable person. This 
interpretation has perhaps slightly been encouraged by the French trans-
lation of the novel that Camus had at hand. Indeed, in the translation by 
69. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 247.
70. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 277.
71. Albert Camus, Les Possédés (Paris: Gallimard, 2010).
72. See, for instance, Brody, “Dostoevsky’s Kirilov in Camus’s ‘Le Mythe de Sisyphe,’” 
291–305. 
73. Ibid., 297.
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Schloezer, Kirilov’s character appears a good deal more rational than in 
the original Russian version. 74 Camus does not even mention that Kirilov’s 
suicide becomes the instrument of Verkhovensky’s and Stavrogin’s political 
schemes. He will only refer to it in passing in L’Homme Révolté 75—without, 
however, questioning the theory of a “superior” suicide he himself had 
defended a few years earlier. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is noticeable that there is something 
typically French about Kirilov’s portrayal as a profound and compelling 
philosophical hero. In Russia, Germany, or the Netherlands, Kirilov has been 
regarded as a caricature of the liberal intelligentsia, a vivid illustration of 
Dostoevsky’s own religious doubt or the impasse of atheism, or even as a 
case study in psychiatry. 76 In France especially, under the influence of Ca-
mus and the “humanization of nothingness,” Kirilov became the proponent 
of a supposedly convincing philosophy of freedom through suicide. While 
Girard often explicitly presents Dostoevsky’s late writings as an antidote to 
the Nietzschean illusions of the superman, it should not be forgotten that 
his reading of the Russian novelist was also a way of opposing the intel-
lectual fashions of his homeland. His interpretation of Kirilov’s suicide in 
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel and Resurrection from the Underground is, very 
likely, an implicit critique of Kojève and Camus (authors whom Girard had 
already read prior to the publication of his first book). 77 This then means 
that Girard’s portrayal of Kirilov also constitutes a statement in opposi-
tion to the French philosophy of his time which, to a large extent, revolved 
around the “humanization of nothingness.” If one follows his reading of 
Dostoevsky, it seems likely that Camus took Kirilov’s reasoning very seri-
ously, because he overlooked the latter’s rivalry with Christ. As a matter 
of fact, Camus states: 
It might be thought that this springs from a concern to distinguish himself 
[Kirilov] from Christ: But in reality it is a matter of annexing Christ. Kirilov, 
74. Julie Vincent, “Le Mythe de Kirilov: Camus, Dostoïevski et les traducteurs,” Comparative 
Literature Studies 8, no. 3 (1971): 245–53.
75. Albert Camus, The Rebel. An Essay on Man in Revolt, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: 
Vintage International, 1991), 176. 
76. Vincent, “Le Mythe de Kirilov,” 251. Vincent’s paper also highlights the fact that, to a 
large extent, Camus’s portrayal of Kirilov was taken for granted by French intellectuals of 
that time.
77. Wolfgang Palaver has noted that Girard’s interpretation of Kirilov’s suicide can be 
regarded as a statement in opposition to Kojève. See Palaver, René Girard’s Mimetic Theory, 
121–2. However, at least to my knowledge, no study has yet been devoted to Girard’s critique 
of Camus’ conception of a “superior” suicide.
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in fact, fancies for a moment that Jesus at his death did not find himself in 
Paradise. He found out then that his torture had been useless. “The laws of 
nature,” says the engineer, “made Christ live in the midst of falsehood and die 
for a falsehood.” Solely in this sense Jesus indeed personifies the whole human 
drama. He is the complete man, being the one who realized the most absurd 
condition. He is not the God-man but the man-god. And, like him, each of us 
can be crucified and victimized—and is to a certain degree. 78
This, I believe, furnishes another example of the thesis I have been seeking 
to defend throughout the present paper: namely, that the negative, under-
stood as the pivotal expression of humanity’s freedom, rests on a denial of 
mankind’s relation to models/obstacles of desire.
Conclusion 
I should, of course, concede that my paper has at best offered readers an 
overview of Girard’s critique of the negative and of the “humanization 
of nothingness.” I have only considered some of his statements directed 
against certain major philosophers. It goes without saying that a more 
thorough study would need to take into consideration a larger sample of 
both thinkers and doctrines. However, this would be more the subject 
of a book than a paper.
In closing, I wish above all to stress the place of Girard’s critique of the 
negative within the larger context of his Christian anthropology. First, it 
is worth noting that Girard’s critique of the negative does not only apply 
to his early writings. It is a critique he maintained throughout his entire 
career. In Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World he states that 
“There can be no question of returning to mystical formulations or their 
philosophical counterparts, such as … the magical power of the negative.” 79 
This remark is consistent with what we saw during this study. Given that 
the negative is, in Girard’s view, mainly a symptom of mankind’s obses-
sion with models/obstacles of desire, this concept can neither be taken as 
a component of dialectical thinking (see our discussion, above, of Hegel’s 
Master−Slave dialectic), nor as a feature of humanity’s absolute freedom 
(see our earlier discussion of Kojève, Sartre, and Camus). However, due to 
the illusions conveyed by metaphysical desire, Western philosophy has 
granted such magical powers to the negative. In The Scapegoat, Girard 
78. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Penguin Books, 
1979), 98. 
79. Girard, Things Hidden, 62–3.
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criticizes the concept of the negative in passing in his analysis of the be-
heading of Saint John the Baptist:
By espousing the violent desire of Salome, all the guests feel as if they are 
satisfying their own desire. Everyone shares the same frenzy toward the 
model obstacle ... It is not Hegelian negativity or the impersonal death of 
the philosophers that guarantees the symbolic quality of the prophet’s head, 
but the mimetic contagion of collective murder. 80
It is through mimetic contagion that the desires of the guests converge to-
wards the same model/obstacle. And “the symbolic quality of the prophet’s 
head” is due to the cathartic and collective effect of murder. Since the 
concept of the negative overlooks the proper dynamics of mimetic desire 
and obstacle addiction, Girard very briefly stresses how irrelevant a tool 
of interpretation the concept of the negative is.
My final remarks will pertain to the relation between Girard’s critique 
of the “humanization of nothingness” and his thoughts on death and res-
urrection. Obviously, death is one of the most significant themes in Gi-
rard’s writings. His inquiry into the origins of religion and culture leads 
to the discovery of the corpse of the innocent victim. The hypothesis of 
a scapegoat mechanism holds that, from the onset, death and culture are 
inseparable. Beneath the language and symbols of primitive religion, one 
always discovers the reality of violent death. “There is no culture without 
a tomb and no tomb without a culture.” 81 Jesus dying on the cross unveils 
what has been hidden since the foundation of the world, which is the burial 
ground on which human culture has been built.
However, Girard’s writings also lay emphasis on a very different attitude 
towards death. This is already evident in his early writings. As shown 
in Resurrection from the Underground, Dostoevsky’s late novels are con-
comitant with his progressively acute understanding of the universality of 
triangular desire. A step at a time, the Russian novelist constantly pushes 
further his inquiry into “underground psychology,” which confronts him 
with an increasingly bleak picture of human nature and an ever more 
shameful image of himself. In his last novels, Dostoevsky rehearses the 
final and most tragic stages of metaphysical desire. He thereby un covers 
an inferno where masochism, sadism, self-deception and, ultimately, death 
80. René Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 135.
81. Girard, Things Hidden, 83. 
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reigns. But there is light at the end of this terrifying tunnel, for his exami-
nation of the darkest corners of the human psyche is accompanied by a 
gradual form of spiritual healing. He comes to comprehend that behind 
the romantic illusions leading to self-destruction and death there is always 
mankind’s delusional attachment to its pride, which is nothing other than 
a denial of the actual similarity between itself and the other. On the one 
hand, the renunciation of pride is a long and painful process—one which 
confronts Dostoevsky with his feelings of incompleteness or, better still, 
the realization of his own “lack of being.” However, on the other hand, 
romantic fallacies of pride end in nothingness and are shown to be noth-
ing more than grotesque deviations from the authentic transcendence of 
the Christian religion. The death of pride—and the realization that pride 
ultimately equals the nothingness of death—leads to the novelist’s rebirth, 
expressed by the radical freedom of his choice to turn towards God and to 
Christian ethics. As Girard puts it: 
Pride goes always toward dispersion and final division, which is to say, toward 
death. But to accept this death is to be reborn into unity. The work that gathers 
in place of scattering, the work that is truly one, will thus itself have the form of 
death and resurrection, i.e., the form of victory over pride … the entire oeuvre and 
the very existence of the novelist have the form of a death and a resurrection. 82
In the final chapter of Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, Girard notices that the 
same Christian symbolism of death and resurrection applies to all great 
novelists (Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust, etc.) who, in dismissing 
the mediator of their desire, achieved a passage beyond their romantic 
delusions of pride and “divine autonomy.” 
Girard would further explore the topic of resurrection in his anthropo-
logical writings. While in primitive religion the victim is sacralized through 
the cathartic effects of collective violence, Jesus is not turned into a god 
by His persecutors but rises again on the third day. Through His death 
and resurrection Jesus shows that the archaic sacred was nothing other 
than sacralized violence, and that a radically different kind of sacredness, 
based on love, self-sacrifice and the renunciation of violence, had arisen. 
Furthermore, as Jesus’s disciples were not immune to mimetic contagion 
within the crowd, it is only thanks to the miracle of resurrection that they 
themselves come to be capable of breaking away from the unanimity of 
the scapegoat mechanism. In Girard’s words, 
82. Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 72–3. Emphasis mine. 
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Only the Resurrection, because it enlightens the disciples, reveals completely 
the things hidden since the foundation of the world, which are the same thing 
as the secret of Satan, never disclosed since the origin of human culture. 83 
How do these considerations relate to my subject matter? For Girard, if 
there were no movement from death back to life, there would be nothing 
beyond the disaster of mankind’s obsession with models/obstacles of de-
sire. Kirilov sees Christ’s Resurrection as a lie, and carries out his suicide 
because he cannot see himself in any other way as His rival. From Kirilov’s 
perspective, if the Resurrection is a lie, then there is room for a more perfect 
death than the Passion of Christ, a death that would lead to a better religion: 
atheistic humanism or the “humanization of nothingness.” His firm belief 
that there is nothing beyond death prevents him from regarding Christ as 
a positive and authentically transcendent model to imitate. In order to get 
beyond the illusory fascination with the negative, one has to become open 
to the possibility of vertical transcendence. Or, to a more limited extent, one 
has at least to be open to the idea that there might be a new life after the 
death of metaphysical desire. The fascination with the negative may well 
be a preamble to the discovery of a deeper self which eventually recovers 
from the symptoms of obstacle addiction. However, such a process should 
not be defined as some sort of Hegelian dialectic, in which the nothingness 
that mankind covets would, in effect, ultimately and necessarily reveal itself 
as such. There is no negation of the negation that would automatically lead 
to a “sublime lucidity.” 84 Rather, Girard contends that it takes conversion to 
achieve such lucidity. And it is through conversion that the last obstacle, 
namely death, will be removed. In the end, Girard’s critique of the negative 
shows that he stayed true to scripture:
For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy 
that shall be destroyed is death.
1 Corinthians 15:25–26 (King James Version Bible)
83. René Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 2001), 125. Emphasis mine. 
84. Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 314. 
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